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Towards a New Theory of Feminist Coalition: 
Accounting for the Heterogeneity of Gender, Race, 
Class, and Sexuality through an Exploration of 
Power and Responsibility
Holly Jeanine Boux, Georgetown University
Abstract: This paper develops a novel theory of feminist coalition that centers and redefines the concepts 
of power and responsibility. After outlining several key ways in which feminist coalition work has been 
addressed by both theorists and practitioners, it goes on to explore how accounting for the complex 
experiences of identity rooted in factors such as race, class, gender, and sexuality continues to complicate 
the process of coalition building and theorizing. From these foundations, the article develops a theory of 
feminist coalition that speaks to how such a movement—or organizations within such a movement—can 
drive the political will for transformation and turn this will into political action without glossing over vital 
differences in people’s daily experiences of gender as it intersects with other systems of domination and 
oppression. The key argument made herein is that an explicit focus on power and responsibility can help us 
develop more functional answers to critical and still pressing questions, such as: Who is included—explicitly 
or implicitly—in feminist coalitions? And what issues, or agendas, are we working towards changing through 
these coalitions?
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This paper begins by outlining several key ways in which feminist coalition work has been addressed by 
both theorists and practitioners, and goes on to explore how accounting for the complex experiences of 
identity rooted in factors such as race, class, gender, and sexuality continues to complicate the process of 
coalition building and theorizing. Building upon a detailed exploration of the germinal coalitional theories 
of Kimberly Christensen and Patricia Hill Collins, as well as more recent coalition-focused literature, I also 
incorporate suggestions from other sources, in particular Lani Guinier and Gerald Torres’s work, into my 
synthesized theory of feminist coalition. My goal in this essay is to develop a theory of feminist coalition 
that speaks to how such a movement—or organizations within such a movement—can drive the political will 
for transformation and turn this will into political action without glossing over vital differences in people’s 
daily experiences of gender as it intersects with other systems of domination and oppression. I develop a 
novel theory of feminist coalition that centers and redefines the concepts of power and responsibility as they 
are applied in traditional feminist coalitional theory. My key argument is that an explicit focus on power 
and responsibility can help us develop more functional answers to critical and still pressing questions, such 
as: Who is included—explicitly or implicitly—in feminist coalitions? And what issues, or agendas, are we 
working towards changing through these coalitions?
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To preserve the impact of Guinier and Torres’s nuanced arguments, this project focuses on synthesizing 
theories of race and gender in the United States in lieu of taking a broader lens to explore the multiplicity 
of lived experiences of identity, and the theorization of these experiences, as they exist internationally. 
The theory and proposals made herein are intended as building blocks in the larger project of developing 
feminist coalitions and coalitional theories that integrate all intersections—including race, class, gender, 
dis/ability, sexuality, and nationality—in a detailed and comprehensive way. 
Why Do We Need to Continue Theorizing about Feminist Coalitions?
This paper focuses on raced and gendered identities in the United States because they are the cornerstones 
of the theories discussed herein, and because questions relevant to coalition building remain pressing in 
this context. One glaring and high-profile example of how questions such as “Who is included in feminist 
coalition?” remain contested within the United States is Patricia Arquette’s highly problematic acceptance 
speech at the 2015 Academy Awards. From the perspective of many feminists, Arquette’s night began 
promisingly with her statement that “it’s our time to have wage equality once and for all” (Arquette 2015). 
However, when interviewed backstage, she continued: “It’s time for all the women in America and all the 
men that love women, and all the gay people, and all the people of color that we’ve all fought for to fight for 
us now” (Hod 2015). In follow-up interviews, Arquette noted her poor phrasing, stating, “You can’t go back 
in time. But, I guess I would have chosen my words a little more carefully. I think the way people perceived 
it is not the way at all I intended” (Hod 2015). While not representative of the many women who understand 
and account for intersectionality in practicing feminist and/or coalitional activism, Arquette’s comments 
are important because they are a very clear example of how many high-profile American women who speak 
on behalf of the feminist movement continue to answer the question “Who is included in feminist coalition?” 
in very exclusionary ways. For Arquette, this group does not include those she is inviting to join “us”—
therefore, not gay people, men, or people of color. As was noted by many observers, Arquette distanced 
not only allies; she also seemingly excluded women of color and lesbian women. This is one anecdotal 
example, but that it happened at the Oscars nods to how, in the American context, feminist coalitional 
work remains a pressing and high-profile matter. Reiterating the endurance of this issue, in early 2016 the 
#OscarsSoWhite hastag trended on Twitter as it had in 2015. In both years this happened in response to 
the fact that all 20 acting nominees for the Academy Awards were White. Thus, in the context of the return 
of the #OscarsSoWhite hashtag in 2016, Arquette’s comments were also revisited. Critics clearly connected 
the issues of wage inequality and racial underrepresentation within the industry in a way that Arquette 
had not, expressing a hope for coalitional work, in particular from powerful White actors who have already 
spoken out on issues of gender inequality. These critics’ hope is that   
stars like Emma Watson, Jennifer Lawrence, Lena Dunham and Bradley Cooper, who are outspoken 
advocates for gender equality, connect that racism and sexism are intertwined; there are people who are 
subjected to one or the other, and there are so many people who are subjected to both. (Kirst 2016) 
Of course, failing to move beyond a monocular analysis that accounts for only one facet of identity is not 
limited to Hollywood (Carastathis 2013). Among feminist writers, these questions remain powerful and 
challenging. For instance, in reviewing a biography of Helen Gurley Brown (Scanlon 2009), Naomi Wolf 
asserted:  
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The fact is, we know the answers to Western women’s problems: The way is mapped out, the time for theory is 
pretty much over. We know the laws and the policies we need to achieve full equality. What we lack is a grass-
roots movement that will drive the political will. (Wolf 2009)
This statement, made by a highly visible feminist and printed in The Washington Post, is problematic on 
several levels. Firstly, critical readers might ask, who are the men that “we”—most likely we as women—will 
be equal to if we follow Wolf’s unspecified plan? As Estelle B. Freedman notes, “when Betty Friedan called 
for liberating women from the home through employment, women of color who had always worked knew 
that joining the men of their race on the job meant they would still encounter discrimination” (Freedman 
2008, 10). Presumably, men of color, oppressed by American racial hierarchies, are not those Wolf has in 
mind when she asserts that “we” can achieve equality with them, because they do not have access to the 
privileges White men enjoy. Disabled men, poor men, and gay men are also likely not who Wolf is talking 
about, because they do not enjoy the social privileges that come with being on the “ability” side of the 
ability/disability system, being economically advantaged, or being heterosexual.
Critical readers might further note that this criticism—that striving to be equal with men is deeply 
problematic because all men are not equally advantaged—has been made repeatedly by feminist theorists 
and activists over the past several decades. In Feminist Theory: From Margin to Center (1984), bell hooks 
“question[ed] the homogeneity of the ‘sisterhood,’ stressing the perspective of race” (Cole 1999, 72) and 
characterized the notion that all women are similarly oppressed as fictitious. hooks noted that this false 
homogeneity is problematic for feminism in general, but that it is especially challenging for coalition 
building (hooks 1984, 44).1 Though she observed this failing over 30 years ago, to judge by Arquette’s 
and Wolf’s comments, false conceptualizations of women’s homogeneity have endured in many powerful 
feminist quarters (Carastathis 2013), as have their powerful and persuasive critiques. For instance, Darnell 
Moore and Monica J. Casper argue against gender-focused feminisms that are seemingly oblivious of race:
It is imperative to us that feminisms continue to engage racism in all its forms and to understand that gender 
and sexual oppression are intimately interwoven with racial oppression and racialized state violence. Because, 
of course, the United States is far from post-racial. Just ask Renisha McBride. Or Marissa Alexander. Or 
the family of Trayvon Martin. Or the families of migrants left to die in the Sonoran Desert or assaulted by 
militarized US border patrol agents. For some feminisms to unfold as if race has receded as an issue is not 
only disingenuous; it perpetuates epistemic violence against people of color. (Moore and Casper 2014)
Similarly powerful and important critiques of these failings have emerged from Black Lives Matter, the 
critical contemporary Black liberation movement (Garza 2014), which has both “put police reform on the 
policy agenda [and] demanded that American society reconsider how it values black lives” (Harris 2015, 
34). In her writings on the genesis of Black Lives Matter, its founder Alicia Garza rebukes progressive 
movements that engage in “the worn out and sloppy practice of drawing lazy parallels of unity between 
peoples with vastly different experiences and histories” (Garza 2014, 3). Rather, she argues that freedom-
focused movements and activists must learn from these mistakes of the past, and she sets out a clear 
mandate: that Black Lives Matter must affirm “the lives of Black queer and trans folks, disabled folks, Black-
undocumented folks, folks with records, women and all Black lives along the gender spectrum” (Garza 
2014, 2). 
Critical readers will also note that even if we were to assume (fallaciously, as feminist theorists and 
activists have highlighted) the existence of a standard “man” that “we” could work towards being equal 
to, if only we did not lack a grass-roots political movement, the question would still remain: “Who is we?” 
(Rich 2001, 82; original emphasis).2 Does the “we” of this American political project of equality include 
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women of color as well as White women? This is a question to which both academics and activists have 
frequently answered “No.”3 Does “we” include lesbians, bisexual or trans women, or only straight women? 
Does it include women of all classes, and not simply those who belong to the middle and upper class? 
Returning to Wolf’s comments, she claims elsewhere in her review that Brown’s biography is “revelatory” 
because it forces women to “think back to a time when bright young women were locked out of the good jobs 
in advertising, publishing, law and other fields and herded into such appallingly underpaid secretarial or 
research roles that they could scarcely make ends meet” (Wolf 2009). Thus, I would assume that lower-class 
women of all races, especially women of color, who (often along with men occupying similar locations in the 
American matrix of domination) are still being herded into appallingly underpaid jobs, are not necessarily 
included in Wolf’s definition of the “we” that could access “full equality.” Finally, if we truly did “know the 
laws and policies we need to achieve full equality” (Wolf 2009), if such equality could be ours if “we” simply 
developed a grass-roots movement, and “if unity on the basis of sexual oppression is something natural”—as 
Wolf seems to indicate by casually claiming that women as a unified group have one political project—“then 
why do we women, the majority people on the planet, still have a problem?” (Jordan 1985, 46).
As theorists and activists from bell hooks to Alicia Garza have highlighted, the same questions that 
arise in response to Arquette’s and Wolf’s statements also frame much of the debate surrounding feminist 
coalitions. It is these coalitions that Wolf is implicitly addressing when she observes that “we” need a grass-
roots political movement. The need for coalition building has been noted by earlier feminist theorists, who 
have underlined that “we’ve pretty much come to the end of a time when you can have a space that is 
‘yours only’—just for the people you want to be there” (Reagon 1983, 357). Questions about the identity 
of the “we” that feminist theory and action is designed to speak to, and work on behalf of, have become 
especially important in this emerging literature, as have questions of what issues or agendas “we” are 
working towards. Given the high-profile status of Arquette’s and Wolf’s comments, and the loud backlash 
they have sparked among contemporary activists, including those within film industry and those within the 
Black Lives Matter community—who are themselves struggling to accommodate the lived heterogeneity 
of the Black liberation movement—it is clear that false conceptualizations of homogeneity and inclusion 
continue to pose real challenges to coalitional organizing.4 Further, these false conceptualizations need 
to be explicitly contested not only by activists in their praxis but also in contemporary feminist theories. 
Because four short sentences in a book review can spawn so many questions about feminism and feminist 
organizing, and further, because they reflect key questions that remain unresolved by theories surrounding 
feminist coalitions, I believe Wolf’s statement that the “time for theory is pretty much over” is clearly and 
fundamentally incorrect. It is theory, especially feminist theory, that “can find a way between the merely 
personal and the mostly political”—which Wolf argues is essential for the feminist political project. As 
proposed herein, this work can be done through analyzing and exploring feminist coalition building, and 
developing responses to questions such as those raised by Wolf’s comment and those that emerge from the 
extant literature concerning feminist coalitions. 
Before delving into the literature concerning feminist coalitions, it is important to note that theory has a 
vital role not only in the development of feminist knowledge but also in conceptualizing possible coalitional 
strategies. In this way, theory can serve several purposes, all of which are key to the conceptualization and 
evaluation of discussions related to feminist coalition. Theory allows us to see patterns that we would have 
otherwise missed, “showing the forest as well as the trees” (Rich 2001, 5). The role that theory plays in feminist 
knowledge production is illuminated by Donna Haraway’s assertion that “feminist objectivity means quite 
simply situated knowledges” (Haraway 1988, 581; original emphasis). According to this epistemology, 
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“none of us alone has a comprehensive vision of how race, class and gender operate as categories of analysis 
or how they might be used as categories of connection”; rather, “our personal biographies offer us partial 
views” (Collins 2004, 540). Thus, it is theory that can give us a lens to illuminate and understand what 
is going on in the world beyond our own position, helping us to see our lives as part of a continuum and, 
ultimately, to decide on concrete steps to be taken based on our position. In this way, theory plays an 
especially important part in developing a grass-roots movement or coalition, such as that advocated by 
Wolf. Though theory does not give us an “all-seeing” perspective, it makes us see and engage with the 
experiences of those in different positions than ourselves.5 Although we will never experience life from a 
position other than that which we individually occupy in society’s matrix of domination, we can develop 
strong cultural critiques of oppression as allies, and the more sympathetic and engaged we are with people 
unlike ourselves, the more we can see things from their perspective and be allies with them, increasing the 
possibility of coalition. Theory is further useful in the project of coalition building because it is a powerful 
tool with which we can see or imagine what could be, or theorize a situation that does not yet exist. In 
this way, political and social theorists and strategists are enabled to work through possibilities and their 
normative implications—e.g., how the answers to questions such as who is “we” and what “we” are working 
towards could have concrete political and organizational results. More specifically, with theorizations of 
feminist coalitions, we can develop theories that acknowledge the intersections of gender with race, class, 
sexuality, and dis/ability, and address how the lived complexities of daily experience complicate these 
mythically homogeneous categories—exposing them as deeply and inextricably affected by the differences 
across people’s lives and positionalities. Such theories not only allow us to “develop awareness about a 
whole spectrum of subordinated histories and struggles [but also] to form coalitions that are potentially 
broader in impact than those who do not do so” (Cho, Crenshaw and McCall 2013, 801). 
In light of the potential gains that theory has to offer for the conceptualization of feminist coalitions, and 
the important developments that have already been made by feminist theorists on this topic, as noted above, 
my goal in this essay is to develop a theory of feminist coalitions that speaks to how such a movement—
or organizations within such a movement—can “find a way between the merely personal and the mostly 
political” (Wolf 2009). Ultimately, this theory seeks to develop a way for feminist coalitions to drive the 
political will for transformation and turn this will into political action. However, such a theory can only be 
successful if it avoids becoming so universalizing that it glosses over important differences in people’s daily 
experiences of gender as it intersects with other systems of domination and oppression, including race, class 
and sexuality, or so fragmented that it prevents any coalescing between and among oppressed groups. This 
project—of acknowledging the unique ways in which overlapping and intersecting systems of oppression 
impact the people who are differentially positioned within them—was importantly advanced by Kimberlé 
Crenshaw’s work on intersectionality. In 1989, Crenshaw noted that because “the intersectional experience 
is greater than the sum of racism and sexism,” theories that analyzed these experiences using only a single 
axis (race or gender but not both) were insufficient to “address the particular manner in which Black women 
are subordinated” (Crenshaw 1989, 140). Similarly, Judith Butler highlights that feminist theories must 
question how our current mobilizing reinforces existing configurations of discourse and power, because 
too often they replicate rather than challenge these configurations. Instead, we must consciously mobilize 
in a way that reworks the matrix of power within which we operate, as well as its legacy (Butler 1992, 13). 
These arguments clearly resonate with the goals of coalition work and theory development, as building 
coalitions and developing coalitional theory necessarily involves bringing together people and issues that 
are not exclusively feminist, and acknowledging how intersectional identities complicate (sometimes 
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problematically) unitary analyses and political movements. Thus, the theory developed in this paper 
attempts to take heed of Crenshaw’s admonitions. 
Nuancing Theories of Feminist Coalition with Race, Class, and Sexuality
Recent theories of feminist coalition have addressed the potential development of coalitions and 
partnerships in ways that are explicitly cognizant of the lived complexities of daily experience. In assessing 
what feminist coalitions are, a useful definition describes them as productive partnerships forged not only 
among those explicitly identifying as feminists but also among women and men who are oppressed by 
systems of domination other than (or in addition to) gender—such as race, class, sexuality, and dis/ability—
but who do not necessarily identify as feminist. These relationships can be characterized as goal-oriented, 
as those who enter into them work toward “forming political coalitions that have the political power to 
fundamentally change this country—[for example,] to feminist as well as antiracist ends” (Christensen 1997, 
644). Similarly, Rosemarie Garland-Thomson provides a useful description of feminist theory, describing 
it as “a collaborative, interdisciplinary inquiry and a self-conscious cultural critique that interrogates how 
subjects are multiply interpellated: in other words, how the representational systems of gender, race, 
ethnicity, ability, sexuality, and class mutually construct, inflect, and contradict one another” (Garland-
Thomson 2002, 3). Reflecting the continuities between these functional definitions, and building upon an 
understanding of feminist theory as a fundamentally coalitional endeavor, in this paper, coalitional theories 
are broadly understood to be theories that explore, critique and propose political coalitions that focus on 
multiple axes of domination and that use the tools of feminist theory. The lived complexities that have 
begun to be addressed by these coalitions and theories about them include various self-interests that cut 
across the mythically homogeneous categories of gender, race, class, sexuality, nationality, and dis/ability, 
among others.6 These complexities have often hindered efforts at building cross-oppression coalitions, as 
well as the development of coalition between feminists. However, the work of Patricia Hill Collins and 
Kimberly Christensen has centered these explorations, and as such will be explored in detail herein.
Before this in-depth examination, it is important to note that while theories specifically addressing 
coalition work have not fully accounted for the reality of how various self-interests can intersect and 
complicate coalition formation, feminist theories outside of this limited area have for many years eloquently 
and explicitly addressed the importance of intersectional identities for feminist theory and organization. 
Working for, and theorizing about, feminist coalitions that acknowledge the intersecting, overlapping, and 
sometimes oppositional interests of race, class, sexuality, dis/ability, and gender is not a new development 
in feminism. Black women and other women of color, as well as lesbian women and feminists focusing on 
integrating dis/ability into feminist theory, have argued for decades that feminism must pay attention to 
intersectional interests, not merely those of upper- or middle-class straight White women.7 During the second 
wave, Black feminists, such as those in the Combahee River Collective, undertook this project (of paying 
attention to intersectional women’s interests) in their 1977 “Black Feminist Statement,” which provides an 
important example of early feminist theory that accounts for the intersections of race, class, and gender.8 
However, it is critical to look at the specific language used in the statement, because it was not an optimistic 
call for feminist coalition. Rather, it states the authors’ realization “that the only people who care enough 
about us to work consistently for our liberation is us” (Combahee River Collective 1977, 365). This accurately 
reflects the reality in which “white-dominated feminist organizations have devoted less energy to issues that 
disproportionately affect low-income women and/or women of color (e.g., sterilization abuse, AIDS, access 
to medical care) than to those issues that disproportionately affect middle-class women or that have a broad 
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cross-class impact (e.g., abortion rights, sexual harassment)” (Christensen 1997, 634). Unfortunately, this 
reality has continued in the years since Christensen eloquently described it, with the “continued exclusion 
of nonwhite women from mainstream feminism” (Loza 2014) and the frequent dismissal of women of 
color from feminist spaces and discussions “in favor of a brand of solidarity that centers on the safety and 
comfort of white women” (Kendall 2013). Multiracial feminist theorists have made similar observations, 
and from this fertile theoretical ground feminist arguments for and about coalitions have emerged.9 The 
diverse theories of multiracial feminists, including Cherríe Moraga and Gloria Anzaldúa, Patricia Williams, 
Adrienne Rich, bell hooks, and Bernice Johnson Reagon, have all made important contributions to this 
project, and the “multiple strategies for social justice embedded in multiracial feminism” (Thompson 2002, 
349) have been used as sources of information for coalitional theory and praxis.10 
Despite the important contributions made by feminist theorists about the intersection of multiple 
systems of oppression, the junctures between gender and interests that are often seen as class-, race- or 
sexuality-based continue to be a source of much disagreement among theorists of feminist coalitions. While 
theoretical disagreement is often productive, and is an important part of knowledge production, especially 
on such contentious issues as coalition building, the answers to the questions of “who is ‘we’?” and “what 
issues or agendas are we working towards?” remain uselessly murky. 
What Is Being Undertheorized in Contemporary Theories of Coalition Work?
The continued inadequacy that feminist theories of coalition have demonstrated in dealing with intersecting 
identities and interests is made especially evident by a comparative review of the theories of Kimberly 
Christensen and Patricia Hill Collins and by the evaluation of their respective prescriptions for feminist 
coalition building. I focus my discussion on these fundamental works because the two authors’ views differ in 
several key ways, allowing me to illustrate with relative parsimony the multidirectional nature of coalitional 
theorizing.11 Further, a goal of this paper is to avoid building my alternative theory upon mischaracterized 
analyses of other theorists’ work, or “straw feminisms.” Such misrepresentation is deeply problematic for 
the feminist project, as it is the “feminist imperative to decompartmentalize, or build bridges, in response 
to a masculinist agenda, which encourages divisiveness in all forms, especially among feminists” (Purvis 
2004, 101).12 
In her 1997 article, “‘With Whom Do You Believe Your Lot Is Cast?’ White Feminists and Racism,” 
Christensen has two main projects: to explore “some of the reasons that the white-dominated feminist 
movement has been less than successful in dealing with institutionalized racism” (Christensen 1997, 618) 
and to launch a discussion into how feminists can “change this situation, to develop a truly antiracist 
feminist theory and practice” (Christensen 1997, 618). Specifically positioning her argument to account for 
how gender and race cannot be seen as homogeneous categories but instead as interests that cut across each 
other, she notes that the “influence of postmodernism on feminist theory has contributed to the ‘decentering’ 
of the feminist subject, drawing attention to the vast differences in life experiences by women of different 
races, classes, sexual orientations, and dis/abilities” (617). However, despite this progress,
feminism has not emerged as a significant force against racism in the United States … [because of] the 
inadequate, individualistic definition of racism prevailing among white feminists (and in the country as a 
whole). This definition of racism, which focuses on racist attitudes rather than on institutionalized inequalities 
of wealth and power by race, has led many feminists to misallocate their antiracist energies. (Christensen 
1997, 618) 
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In light of this finding, Christensen makes several significant and specific suggestions about building 
feminist coalitions. These suggestions must be considered in order to build upon the foundation established 
by her germinal work in order to develop a theorization of feminist coalition that accounts for the lived 
complexities of daily experience in a more nuanced way than these issues are characterized by the extant 
literature on coalition work. Firstly, Christensen notes that in order to be allies with those unlike ourselves we 
need to listen carefully to those occupying positions different from ours. Noting how men can be allies with 
the feminist cause, she implores feminists to undertake a similar project of careful and attentive listening in 
order to build coalitions with those whose experiences and goals we may not immediately see and embrace 
as our own. The end goal of such diverse coalitions is concrete, material change. Thus, Christensen asks 
men who seek to ally themselves with feminists, to “listen—listen carefully to the diverse experiences and 
writings of feminists—and to take our words seriously. Taking our words seriously would mean acting to 
change the material reality of women’s lives” (620). She also argues that it is White women’s responsibility 
to do similarly with the words of feminists of color. Secondly, Christensen directly addresses what issues 
these coalitions should focus on, arguing that coalition building needs to coalesce not only around specific 
predetermined causes but that “shared interests … will have to be constructed thorough working together 
and coming to trust each other as political allies” with the goal of building a “political community dedicated 
to the eradication of patriarchy and racism (and other forms of oppression)” (633). 
Christensen’s theory is an important contribution to the debates concerning feminist coalition-building; 
however, it is also problematic in several ways. Firstly, she focuses overwhelmingly on how the effects of race 
and gender are intertwined, but does not fully incorporate discussions of how these structures of oppression 
are further complicated by class, sexuality and dis/ability. When she does discuss the effects of class- and 
sexuality-based oppressions on gender- and race-based systems of subjugation, Christensen notes that 
“oppression by race, class, culture, sexual orientation, and gender, as well as along other axes of difference 
are all fundamental and interact with each other in complicated ways” (Christensen 1997, 632; emphasis 
added). She further argues that “it is only by acknowledging and theorizing about the origin and contradictory 
nature of our more privileged class positions that middle-class women of all sexual orientations can begin to 
dream of and build an economy that meets the needs of all women—and all people” (635). While this is an 
important argument, Christensen does not adequately explain this theorization as her text remains focused 
on engaging specifically with race and gender. Though she notes that discussions of class and sexuality 
are, to use her description, of “fundamental” importance, she does not heed her own advice and largely 
does not engage with these issues. They remain ancillary to her principal theses, which situate gender- and 
race-based oppressions as primary and those rooted in class and sexuality as secondary, rather than giving 
them equal treatment and thus recognizing them as truly fundamental. This complicates Christensen’s 
concrete suggestions for how coalitions should specifically address policy change. She argues that antiracist 
feminist coalitions must focus not only on issues which are clearly feminist or raced, but that they also 
must work to change policies that “may not be labeled as ‘racial’ but that have a vastly disproportionate 
impact on people of color” (639). She is right to suggest that issues such as educational funding, campaign 
spending, congressional redistricting, health care, and welfare must be part of a comprehensive coalitional 
project. Indeed, when trying to address inadequacies in these public policies, many organizations and social 
movements persist in framing their analyses “to address primarily the concerns of individuals who, but 
for one marginalized status, are otherwise privileged” (Cole and Luna 2010, 75). Yet Christensen fails to 
account for the reality that these issues are not only raced and gendered but also classed and heterosexed. 
Secondly, Christensen makes the following important point: 
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Being an antiracist [feminist] means more than “raising one’s consciousness” about racism and struggling 
to reduce interpersonal racism within the women’s movement. It means engaging in political struggles to 
change the basic economic and political power relations of this society…. It means working in coalitions where 
feminist issues are not always first on the agenda. (643) 
But this theoretical conceptualization of “feminist issues” is troubling. By saying that they may not be first 
on the agenda, Christensen is defining feminist issues as distinct from antiracist issues—which presumably 
are what feminist issues may be taking a back seat to in these coalitions. In other words, she separates 
feminist issues from racial issues. From an intersectional perspective, this statement is problematic because 
Christensen is defining some issues that impact women as nonfeminist and treating “race and gender as 
mutually exclusive categories of experience and analysis” (Crenshaw 1989, 139). Even if gender isn’t the 
primary axis of difference or oppression on a particular issue, saying that such an issue is not feminist 
seems to contradict Crenshaw’s argument that intersectional problems such as racism are impacted by more 
than one axis of oppression; for example, in discussing racism, Crenshaw notes that “gender subordination 
does contribute significantly to the destitute conditions of so many African Americans” and that “it must 
therefore be addressed” (Crenshaw 1989, 162). If we are to accurately account for lived complexities and the 
ways in which multiple forms of domination overlap and intersect in the lives of people subjugated by these 
systems, we must learn from the arguments of feminists such as those in the Combahee River Collective 
and recognize that antiracist issues are feminist issues, as all women are affected by race, whether they are 
privileged or oppressed by their own racial identities. 
Consistent with Christensen’s approach, in “Toward a New Vision: Race, Class, and Gender as Categories 
of Analysis and Connection” (2004), Collins also directly addresses how race, class and sexuality complicate 
feminist coalition work, and how they trouble the notion that gender can be characterized as a homogeneous 
category around which coalitions can be built. In this work, Collins asks two basic questions: “First, how 
can we reconceptualize race, class and gender as categories of analysis? Second, how can we transcend the 
barriers created by our experiences with race, class and gender oppression in order to build the types of 
coalitions essential for social change?” (Collins 2004, 530). She answers these questions by arguing that
we must acquire both new theories of how race, class and gender have shaped the experiences not just of 
women of color, but of all groups. Moreover, we must see the connections between these categories of analysis 
and the personal issues in our everyday lives, particularly our scholarship, our teaching, and our relationships 
with our colleagues and students. (530) 
Collins’s paper is especially valuable as a building block for theorizations of feminist coalition because of 
her direct and nuanced treatment of the lived intersections between race, class, gender, and sexuality. She 
insightfully addresses how our own location and self-interest can blind us to others’ experiences, noting 
that while we often “have little difficulty assessing our own victimization within some major system of 
oppression, whether it be by race, social class, religion, sexual orientation, ethnicity, age or gender, we 
typically fail to see how our thoughts and actions uphold someone else’s subordination” (Collins 2004, 
529). As she elaborates, “each group identifies a type of oppression with which it feels most comfortable as 
being fundamental and classifies all other types as being of lesser importance” (529). Thus Collins’s theory 
importantly reveals how coalition work can be developed that pays heed to the complexities of overlapping 
and intersecting oppressions: 
For middle class white women, gender may assume experiential primacy unavailable to poor Hispanic women 
struggling with the ongoing issues of low-paid jobs and the frustrations of the welfare bureaucracy. This 
recognition that one category may have salience over another for a given time and place does not minimize 
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the theoretical importance of assuming that race, class and gender as categories of analysis structure all 
relationships. (Collins 2004, 532)
Building upon this characterization of self-interest, Collins prescriptively suggests that “we must transcend 
these barriers by moving toward race, class and gender as categories of connection, by building relationships 
and coalitions that will bring about social change” (Collins 2004, 537). However, the notion that we can 
“transcend” our differences is problematic. As Guinier and Torres assert in The Miner’s Canary (2002), 
sustainable collective action that crosses the narrow boundaries of these self-interests requires “a willingness 
to engage with internally embedded hierarchies of race and class privilege” (137–38), and that we must not 
try to simply transcend these barriers without exploring how we are implicated in, participating in, and 
potentially supporting, the continued maintenance of hierarchies of oppression. 
Collins’s and Christensen’s theories are foundational pieces in the extant literature on coalition work. To 
varying degrees, both authors engage with the reality that race, class, gender, and sexuality transect each 
other and complicate coalition work around all of these issues. Thus, the difficulties present in Collins’s and 
Christensen’s theories not only reflect the challenges of capturing how the multifaceted and concurrent 
systems of oppression complicate organization on the basis of the mythically homogeneous categories of 
race, class, gender, and sexuality. They also reflect how difficult it is to resolve issues relating to these 
competing and intersecting self-interests, which have caused profound difficulties in forming and theorizing 
about feminist coalitions. Furthermore, the points of disagreement and confusion between their theories 
are also representative of broader disagreements within the coalitional literature. These key fault lines 
can be identified as follows: disagreements between trying to transcend difference and engaging with it 
directly; viewing difference as a source of potential connection versus seeing it as a source of irreconcilable 
disconnection; and focusing coalitional work around specific policy issues or developing these connections 
around groups of people. Ultimately, while difference and disagreement are vital to feminism, these 
elementary dissentions about the nature of coalition have prevented cohesive answers to the questions 
of “who are ‘we’?” and “what are we working for?” from being formulated by those seeking to engage in 
coalitional work, as theorists including Christensen and Collins, but also others such as Adrienne Rich and 
Chandra Talpade Mohanty, have answered these fundamental questions in essentially divergent ways. 
While the topics named above have generated much dispute, other issues have remained largely 
unaddressed in the feminist literature focused on coalition building. The theory I propose in this paper 
cannot completely resolve the divisions listed above—indeed, I am unsure if any one theory can. But by 
theorizing on the issues that have been left out of explicit discussion by the extant feminist literature on 
coalition building—power and responsibility—we can develop more nuanced and unified answers to some 
of the fundamental questions of coalition building, including “who are ‘we’?” and “what are we working 
towards?”
Towards a Novel Intersectional Theory of Feminist Coalitions 
In this paper, I critique several current theories of feminist coalition, but my fundamental goal is to build 
upon existing literature to develop a “generative” theorization of this type of coalition. This theory is 
“generative” insofar as it is constructive, instead of exclusively critical. Similarly, while it is intended to 
be informative for both praxis and theorization, it is not necessarily prescriptive (Mack-Canty 2004). This 
understanding of “generative” theory is related to Erik Erikson’s conceptualization, as both Colleen Mack-
Canty and Erikson describe generative theory as theory developed for the future, often in the political arena 
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and built through engaging in the process of ideologically motivated activism. However, unlike Erikson’s 
“psychosocial generativity, which is defined as the desire to contribute to future generations” (Duncan 1999, 
630), herein “generative” describes a theory that both contributes to future theorization about coalition and 
can be used constructively while engaging in coalitional development and politics. By engaging in generative 
theory building, this section illustrates a way forward in feminist coalition building that deals with the gaps 
outlined above. In particular, I describe a path that addresses the roles power and responsibility must play 
in theories of coalition work to more fully account for the ways that gender, race, class, and sexuality cut 
across each other and derail the development of coalition around these mythically homogeneous categories. 
Power
As Maxine Baca Zinn and Bonnie Thornton Dill note, “power is the cornerstone of women’s differences. 
This means that women’s differences are connected in systematic ways” (1996, 327; original emphasis). 
Although she fails to explicitly incorporate discussions of power into her prescriptions concerning feminist 
coalition, Christensen also mentions the importance of power in feminist theories, arguing that “much of 
the power of the second wave of feminism came from the insight that our ‘personal’ problems were, in fact, 
political—the result of power differentials created and reproduced in the broader society and acted out in 
every facet of our ‘personal’ lives” (1997, 621). Indeed, despite the primacy given to this issue in broader 
theories of feminism, and the “myriad different, and in many cases contradictory, definitions of power 
[that] are influential in contemporary social and political theory” (Allen 1999, 121), the way power can 
be used as a tool in feminist coalitional theory and praxis is undertheorized. Amy Allen expands upon the 
critical importance of the concept of power for feminist theory at length in her book, The Power of Feminist 
Theory: Domination, Resistance, Solidarity (1999), arguing that “we have yet to develop a satisfactory 
account of this central concept” (1) and that its past conceptualizations have been incomplete. Allen 
addresses this gap by formulating a broad definition of power that characterizes it “simply as the ability 
or capacity of an actor or set of actors to act” (1999, 127). 
Usefully, Allen’s work does address the centrality of power for the practice of solidarity and coalition 
building; she highlights that this feminist conception of power is not only important for definitional clarity 
but also necessary “to be able to adequately theorize empowerment and resistance” (1999, 2). That 
adequately conceptualizing power is critical for feminist work, particularly that which involves diverse 
individuals, is a theme to which Allen returns with her observation that “we have an interest in theorizing 
the kind of collective power that can bridge the diversity of individuals who make up the feminist 
movement” (122). However, rather than discussing how this understanding of power might facilitate such 
bridging, Allen’s book is focused on arriving at this definition. While her understanding of power relates 
clearly to the feminist coalitional project, she does not theorize how this type of power could function in 
coalitional work. 
The role of power in the process of empowerment and resistance has been usefully theorized, however, 
by theorists of coalition work, notably by Guinier and Torres in The Miner’s Canary (2002). Similarly to 
Allen, they point out that power has traditionally been a central concept in feminist theorizing: 
In the 1970s feminist scholars, working out the links between the personal and the political, began to redefine 
power as collective energy and realization. Resisting the idea that feminists should address only questions 
surrounding personal changes, they called instead for recognition that change takes place along multiple axes 
of human interaction…. Thus feminists say that it is critically important to change the context in which … 
relationships occur. (Guinier and Torres 2002, 139)
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Guinier and Torres explicitly chose “not to stress the link between gender and power, although it is a 
potentially important site of struggle,” albeit they invited “others to explore it further” (163). In light of this 
suggestion, I argue that their feminist definition of power as collective energy and realization can be usefully 
incorporated into theories of feminist coalition in order to develop more powerful answers to the questions 
of who “we” are, and what we seek to accomplish through coalition. This conceptualization of power is 
especially relevant to social movements and coalitions because it challenges the zero-sum definition of 
power that is commonly, if implicitly, used to describe power in society. Guinier and Torres describe this 
hegemonic conceptualization of power as “power-over” (2002, 141), where if one person or group has 
power, another by definition cannot. When power is understood in this way, the lived complexities of daily 
experience of self-interests such as race, gender, sexuality, and class, necessarily undermine coalitional 
possibilities, for if one group—for example, women—are gaining power, or reducing their oppression, other 
groups—such as racial minorities—are necessarily losing out. This characterization of power is further 
problematic for intersectional identities: As women gain power, women who are racial minorities or from 
a lower socioeconomic class are torn between their gendered improvement and their increased oppression 
along race- or class-based lines. It appears that Christensen, for example, implicitly conceptualizes power 
as such “power-over” in her theory. As she separates feminist from antiracist issues, she indicates that 
either can be advanced by coalitional work, but that in coalitions, although they can have shared interests, 
only one set of issues at a time can be primary. Returning to Allen’s understanding of power, we can see that 
her arguments on behalf of a broad definition of feminist power echo these concerns about narrow “power-
over” conceptualizations. In rejecting this common understanding, she reinforces the idea of power being 
connected to solidarity and points out that 
the goal of the feminist movement is not to put women in a position to exact at long last our revenge for the 
suffering we have endured under a hetropatriarchal society. Thus it does not make sense to view the solidarity 
that enables the feminist movement to formulate and achieve its objectives as merely an instance of power-
over. (Allen 1999, 126)
Wary of giving primacy to this domination-focused understanding of power, Allen includes both “power-
over” and “power-with” in her definition of power, noting that “power-with” can be understood as “the 
ability of a collectivity to act together for the attainment of an agreed-upon end or series of ends” (126–27). 
Rather than including both “power-over” and “power-with” in their conceptualization of power, 
Guinier and Torres focus upon the latter, and further, they define it in a profoundly different way than 
Allen, as “the psychological and social power gained through collective resistance and struggle and through 
the creation of an alternative set of narratives” and as “relational and interactive” (2002, 141). Guinier and 
Torres’s definition of power is particularly promising as a useful tool for feminist coalition building precisely 
because of this focus on “power-with” rather than “power-over.” While Allen’s comprehensive definition is 
useful because it highlights that feminist praxis and theorization often involves the illlumination of or the 
fight against “power-over” exercises of power—both inside and outside our coalitions—in coalitional work 
the use of “power-over” strategies is problematic. Indeed, exercise of “power-over” runs the risk engaging 
in what Butler argues we must not do if we are to challenge existing configurations of discourse and 
power—that is, “adopt the very models of domination by which we were oppressed” (1992, 14) and use our 
theories and praxis to reify previous power structures, rather than to challenge them. 
Although Guinier and Torres’s model of power is useful for the development of theory and for building 
political coalitions, as the authors themselves note, their reconceptualization is particularly helpful in 
understanding how power can function in social movements, as in this arena “prospects for social change 
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do not always depend upon strategies that pit one oppression against another in a competing hierarchy of 
power”: “Rather, those who hold a vision of transformation can learn ways to move outside and apart from 
the current models of power” (2002, 143). This additive, rather than zero-sum, definition of power allows 
antiracist issues to be considered as feminist issues, because when one group (e.g., women) gains this type 
of power, other allied groups (e.g., racial minorities) do not necessarily lose out. Thus, this conceptualization 
suggests “the possibility of shared and circulating power” (Guinier and Torres 2002, 142), which is essential 
to make feminist coalitions work. 
Redefining power using Guinier and Torres’s “power-with” definition seemingly addresses Christensen’s 
problematic use of “power-over” in her theory. Further, this redefinition points to a more potent answer 
to the question of “who are we?” because in this model “we” is defined not only by competing ascriptive 
identities but also by not “what you call yourself but with whom you link your fate” (Guinier and Torres 
2002, 10). Similarly, the issues that we are working towards do not have to be exclusively feminist or 
antiracist (or nonheterosexist, or aimed at abolishing class divisions) because these can be addressed in 
overlapping ways. Such coalitions would still be feminist and deal with issues that concern or affect many 
women, but by employing this redefinition of power they could also be antiracist, anticlassist, and so on.  
Responsibility
Several feminist theorists mention accountability and responsibility as important to the achievement of 
feminist goals; however, as with power, responsibility’s significant role in shaping feminist coalitions has 
been undertheorized. Despite this neglect, a sense of responsibility plays a clear role in shaping feminist 
behavior. Jennifer Purvis underscores that 
by enabling feminists to see themselves as distinct from other generations, rather than admit to continuities, 
the generational divide [between second- and third-wave feminism] serves as a kind of inoculation against 
confronting the persistence of these forces…. The result is that we perpetuate such problems. Younger 
feminists, feminists with new strategies, or any feminists who persist in separating themselves from patterns 
of racism and classism, in effect, refuse to engage in critical appraisals of their own privilege and internalized 
prejudices, or conscientiously locate and eradicate the racism and classism within feminist discourses and 
practices. (2004, 107) 
Certainly, this type of perpetuation of oppressive hierarchies is not the sole purview of younger feminists, 
as traditionally “U.S. and European women’s studies have challenged the seemingly hegemonic ideas of 
elite white men [while] ironically … also suppress[ing] Black women’s ideas” (Collins 2000, 5). Collins 
underlines that not all White women participate in such suppression, and that “some do try to build coalitions 
across racial and other markers of difference, often with noteworthy results” (6). However, replication 
of oppressive structures in feminist work is an important reason to argue for a “politics of engagement 
rather than a politics of transcendence” (Mohanty 2003, 469) in order to require that the members of the 
dominant group acquire knowledge of the practices of the dominated groups (Narayan 1989, 256) and 
prevent further marginalization of those more (or differently) oppressed than themselves. This is especially 
important during the theorization and building of feminist coalitions, because “we need theory that will 
enable us to articulate alternative ways of thinking about (and thus acting upon) gender without either 
simply reversing the old hierarchies or confirming them” (Scott 1988, 33). Thus, it is the responsibility of 
all those who benefit from their positionality in some way to engage with differences between feminists and 
among other social-justice activists as well, instead of attempting to transcend these differences and risking 
to become part of someone else’s problem by refusing to deal with issues of race or class (Collins 2004). 
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Ultimately, this means that each of us must seek to learn how we are implicated in the oppression of others, 
and we have to take responsibility for understanding our privilege and how our privilege oppresses others 
in order to effectively work in coalition without oppressing those we are in coalition with. 
Responsibility is also an important attribute for theories of feminist coalition because of its connection to 
self-interest. JeeYeun Lee emphasizes how responsibility and self-interest are connected in describing how 
they affect the issues we choose to address in our theorizations of coalition: “such an overwhelming array of 
problems can numb and immobilize us, or make us concentrate our energies too narrowly. I don’t think that 
we have to address everything fully at the same time, but we must be fully aware of the limitations of our 
specific agendas” (Lee 1995, 72; original emphasis). Through noting that one cannot possibly address every 
issue of oppression, Lee illuminates how our personal agendas cannot get in the way of seeing the bigger 
picture of our connection. She underlines that this responsibility to pay attention not only to how we are 
marginalized but also to how we marginalize others is in our best interests because as “progressive activists 
[we] cannot afford to do the masters’ work for them by continuing to carry out oppressive assumptions and 
exclusions” (72). 
While feminist theory has engaged with the connections between responsibility and self-interest, 
coalitional theory is largely quiet on this nexus. However, the connection is already driving coalitional 
praxis. In interviews with practitioners of feminist coalition in the United States, both Jean East (2000) 
and Elizabeth R. Cole and Zakiya T. Luna (2010) found that the activists with whom they spoke explicitly 
highlighted the role that self-interest and responsibility had in shaping their work. Speaking with welfare 
advocates, East found that responsibility for self and others was a key theme in their organizing effort. 
Similarly, in response to the question “what, other than perceptions of basic self-interest, motivates groups 
that define themselves as different to work together?” (72), Cole and Luna found that activists such as 
Andrea Smith (whose work focuses on Native Americans and violence in communities of color) identified 
mutual responsibility as a driving factor in their getting involved in coalitional work. As Smith highlighted, 
“everyone has a responsibility, I feel, to be engaged in collective action in some regards” (Cole and Luna 
2010, 77).
Emphasizing the connection between responsibility and personal self-interest makes clear that it is not an 
act of charity to help others: We must help them struggle against their oppression out of a sense of personal 
connection and, as those working in feminist coalitional praxis have argued, because of how our privilege is 
supported by the oppression of others around the globe (Cole and Luna 2010). Prominent feminist theorists 
of color have long argued that the intersection of privilege means that feminist organizations must also 
address issues of race and class (and, more recently, sexuality) in order to truly represent the interests of 
all women. Notably, Collins forcefully made the point that “doing intellectual work of the sort envisioned 
within Black feminism requires a process of self-conscious struggle on behalf of Black women, regardless 
of the actual social location where that work occurs” (Collins 2000, 15). However, by exploring this issue 
through the lens of responsibility and self-interest it is possible to reframe it from one of justice (Collins 
2000) to one of self-interest. In this way, it becomes clear that it is not only hypocritical for feminists 
in locations of class-based, racial or sexual privilege to implicitly maintain their White, upper-class, or 
heterosexual advantage while dedicating important time and energy to erasing male privilege—it is also 
against their own self-interest. 
Importantly, this connection helps to resolve the question asked of us by feminists from Judith Butler 
to Adrienne Rich: “Who is we?” (Butler 1992; Rich 2001). This question is often complicated by the reality 
that gender, race, class, and sexuality include necessarily heterogeneous groups of people with identities 
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that intersect across all of these forms of oppression. Explicitly acknowledging how responsibility and self-
interest affect feminist coalitions sheds some needed light on a possible answer. For example, it undermines 
Naomi Wolf’s narrow focus on Western women’s interests, exposing how the interests of women who can be 
considered “Western” (whoever those women may be) do not stand alone, but instead rely on the connected 
subjugation of women and other oppressed people in non-Western regions, as well as non-Western women 
within the borders of the United States. Thus, because of our responsibility as well as our self-interests, “we” 
cannot be exclusively Western women, or White upper-class women, because the interests of all women 
are interconnected. And, if we (as members of feminist coalitions, which could include men who are also 
oppressed by racial, sexuality and dis/ability issues and committed to working against these oppressions in 
coalition with feminists and using feminist methodologies) ignore this form of connection, we risk working 
against our own interests by oppressing others.
 Furthermore, the connection between responsibility and self-interest speaks directly to the issues that 
feminist coalitions must work towards. More specifically, it profoundly affects whether individual choice 
should be the ultimate goal of feminist coalitions, or whether group interest must also play a role. This is 
an important and deep-seated divide in feminist theory, which I do not propose to resolve herein; however, 
I agree with Guinier and Torres’s assertion that we can no longer afford to overlook public values in the 
name of private decision making. This is not to say that choice is not important. Choice clearly plays an 
important role in responsibility. As Collins points out, “while we may not have created this situation, we 
are each responsible for making individual, personal choices concerning which elements of race, class and 
gender oppression we will … work to change” (Collins 2004, 540). However, the privileging of choice, often 
associated with the priorities of third-wave feminism (Shugart, Waggoner and Hallstein 2001, 195), is deeply 
problematic as the ultimate or exclusive feminist end. For example, Christensen (1997) locates the source 
of the White feminist movement’s inability to effectively deal with racism in its continued focus on racist 
attitudes of individuals, rather than on dealing with racism as a system of institutionalized inequalities. 
Furthermore, the “modal ‘person’ in feminist theory still appears to be a self-sufficient individual adult” 
(Flax 1987, 640). Norma Alarcón (1990) argues that this is already a position of domination as it does not 
reflect the experiences of women or people of color. Ultimately, the privileging of choice is problematic in 
coalitional work because it assumes that all are free to make whatever choices they want. This assumption, 
however, does not reflect the lived reality of gender, class, race, and sexuality, and ignores how “women and 
men throughout the social order experience different forms of privilege and subordination” (Zinn and Dill 
1996, 327) and ultimately have their range of choices constrained by their positionality (Hirschmann 2010). 
Thus, while agency and choice are important in coalition, because of the heterogeneous nature of categories 
of oppression and overlapping self-interest, as well as our responsibility to engage with this difference as 
feminists, personal choice cannot represent the entirety of goals towards which feminist coalitions work, 
and the advancement of group rights must also be primary. 
In order to connect this theorization of responsibility, and its relationship with self-interest and (to 
a more limited extent) choice, to the possibilities of effective praxis grounded in these concepts, it is 
instructive to turn to Koritha Mitchell’s article “Love in Action: Noting Similarities between Lynching Then 
and Anti-LGBT Violence Now” (2013). Herein, she observes that those in positions of power within society 
and within movements (including movements that strive to achieve feminist goals) often do not recognize 
their responsibility to engage with issues that may not have an immediately deleterious impact on their 
life. Rather, she points out, the unfortunate reality is that “until issues ‘hit home,’ too many Americans 
avoid the greater challenge that justice requires: acknowledging one’s own privilege” (Mitchell 2013, 707). 
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In the current theorization of coalition as grounded in “power-with” and responsibility, what Mitchell is 
describing is essentially the shirking of responsibility. Yet, can this shirking be avoided when working 
towards common justice-focused goals in feminist coalition? How does a theorization of coalition grounded 
in responsibility push those with power to recognize and act against injustice, even when these issues have 
not fully “hit home,” and when other theorizations, such as those centered on choice, have failed to achieve 
this objective? 
While Mitchell’s focus is not directly on the implications of responsibility for feminist coalition, her work 
nevertheless promisingly starts to answer these questions by highlighting how responsibility for engaging 
in the work of a coalition can be made explicit to all involved without simultaneously conflating intragroup 
differences. This theory pushes back against shirking and productively highlights how responsibility could 
be incorporated into feminist activist practice by suggesting that 
One way to tackle the mentalities that support current conditions is to change our language. Language is not 
simply a way of communicating what one thinks; it actually shapes what one is capable of thinking. I therefore 
propose using language that focuses less on the disadvantage of oppressed groups and more on the unearned 
advantage of privileged ones. (Mitchell 2013, 706; original emphasis)
This suggestion to focus not only on disadvantage but on unearned advantage makes a more universal 
conceptualization of responsibility explicit. Responsibility to engage with an issue is no longer something 
of which privileged individuals can opt out in relative comfort until the issue “hits home.” Rather, this 
linguistic reframing makes it abundantly clear with whom responsibility lies—it makes the issue “hit home.” 
In Mitchell’s argument, if the question is, “For whom do issues of injustice necessarily ‘hit home’?” (just those 
suffering their most deleterious effects, or all of those working in coalition?), the answer is “the latter”—and 
this is clear even from the way we speak about the issues and the inequalities we want to change. 
Indeed, Mitchell’s prescription provides a useful starting point for a praxis that builds upon a foundation 
of both “power-with” and responsibility and does not reinforce old hierarchies, as Scott (1988) and Butler 
(1992) warn against. It accomplishes the latter by placing responsibility for engagement with those in 
positions of privilege instead of overburdening the unprivileged. Further, it encourages engagement rather 
than withdrawal by both those with privilege and those without by highlighting the interconnected nature 
of unearned advantages and by setting the responsibility to speak out against them explicitly at the feet of 
those for whom they might not otherwise “hit home” (Mitchell 2013, 706). In making this suggestion, that 
coalitional praxis start from a place of linguistic shift, Mitchell does not conflate intragroup differences, 
nor does she privilege some identities over others. But she does point out that she is truly calling for a 
revolutionary type of change by even noticing privilege 
because recognizing privilege is what Americans are most discouraged from doing. Clearly, then, refusing to 
identify privilege helps keep our society the way it is. When we refuse to acknowledge long-standing, unearned 
advantage, we fortify the status quo. Therefore, any hope of disrupting the unjust status quo—any hope of 
making real change—will involve noticing privilege. (Mitchell 2013, 708)
However, in order to work in coalition without obfuscating that this involves negotiating the daily experience 
of multiple differences, such a revolution is worthwhile. 
Conclusion
In their work on feminist coalitions, theorists such as Collins and Christensen usefully problematized the 
“mythically homogeneous” categories of gender, race, class, and sexuality. Accurately reflecting how varying 
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self-interests have multifaceted and shifting effects on us all, these complexities have been challenging for 
coalition building and theorizing, as “often the multiplicity and contradictions of our identities [have been] 
disregarded by social movements that have failed to grasp the social totality and lived experiences of multiple 
oppressions” (Carastathis 2013, 961). This paper builds upon these important theories of feminist coalition 
by centering the concepts of power and responsibility to develop a theory that more powerfully accounts for 
how the lived complexities of daily experience complicate the mythically homogeneous categories of gender, 
race, class, and sexuality, ultimately impacting the formation of coalitions. While I agree with June Jordan’s 
assertion that “when these factors of race and class and gender absolutely collapse is whenever you try to 
use them as automatic concepts of connection” (1985, 46), these complexities do not mean that coalition 
is impossible. With a non-zero-sum understanding of power and by paying explicit attention to the role of 
responsibility in feminist action and theory, coalitions that make important room for the real differences 
between the lives of people who occupy many positions of self-interest can be built. Further, they can 
engage with these multiple identities without the need for complete organizational disaggregation around 
individual self-interests. My theory is not proposing “a full-blown theory of social movements” (Guinier 
and Torres 2002, 31), nor am I arguing that acknowledging the key roles of power and responsibility will 
resolve disagreements among and within social movements. Instead, like Guinier and Torres, what I am 
proposing is that by linking our fate to those of our allies through theorizing about power and responsibility, 
we can “struggle together for larger social justice ideals … [such as] more democratic forms of relationships 
and of power itself” (Guinier and Torres 2002, 289–90), instead of focusing on defining hard and fast 
limits to which issues are feminist and which are not. Using Mitchell’s suggestion that we reconceptualize 
how we think and speak about advantage and disadvantage, we can also begin to determine how to put 
the current theorization of feminist coalition into action while discouraging avoidance of responsibility. 
With alternative conceptualizations of feminist activism, such as those centered around “choice,” choosing 
not to engage when an issue does not hit home can be considered a legitimate option. As choice feminists 
“believe that any mistakes that a feminist might make are less pernicious than the restraint of others on 
her decision-making” (Kirkpatrick 2010, 242), even in coalitional work, the choice not to engage might be 
considered acceptable. However, by highlighting unearned advantage, rather than focusing exclusively on 
disadvantage, and by founding feminist coalitional activism around responsibility rather than choice, issues 
“hit home” for those with relative advangage and disadvantage, and all are responsible for working toward 
change instead of being given an opening to choose to “opt out.” This theorization reflects what is at the 
heart of feminist coalitional work—working together to challenge unjust and hegemonic power structures. 
As Jordan forcefully asks, we need to more consciously assess “why should [others] give a shit about [my 
rights, freedoms and desires] unless I do something, for real, about [theirs]?” (1985, 41). Or, “as community 
organizer Mandy Carter puts it, ‘Are we about justice? Or, are we about just us?’” (Mitchell 2013, 690).
Ultimately, this theory, like those that came before it, is incomplete. It does not capture the infinite 
complexities of how people interact on a daily basis with systems of race, class, gender, sexuality, and 
dis/ability, interactions that are multiple and ever-changing. For example, this paper has not explored 
the unique ways in which dis/abilities could contribute to feminist coalitional efforts, or how feminist 
arguments and theories could make an in-depth contribution to the emerging field of dis/ability studies. As 
Garland-Thomson has pointed out, this is an unfortunately common problem, as “feminist theories all too 
often do not recognize disability in their litanies of identities that inflect the category of woman” (2002, 2). 
I also cannot provide hard and fast answers to the questions raised by Wolf’s comments, namely, who are 
“we” and what do we stand for? However, I do address these questions by making room for the complexities 
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of race, class, gender, sexuality, and dis/ability in feminist theory, and arguing that it is not necessary that 
“we” be a group narrowly defined by a single set of interests. With a non-zero-sum conceptualization of 
power and a true responsibility to engage with difference, “we” can work together on varying interests. 
Conflicts will inevitably still occur; however, they do not need to be fatal because gains for some will not 
necessarily mean losses for others. 
As they are primarily theoretical, my suggestions are a tool to imagine what could be; they do not indicate 
such coalitions will come to fruition nor that coalition building will be easy. This is clearly underlined by 
Bernice Johnson Reagon, who points out that one of the reasons why “we are stumbling is that we are at 
the point where in order to take the next step we’ve got to do it with some folk we don’t care too much 
about” (1983, 368). On this, current feminist theories largely agree, and I do as well. As Lee highlights, 
this is “one of the primary hallmarks of young feminists’ activism today: We realize that coming together 
and working together are by no means natural or easy” (1995, 73). Coalition work may not be easy, but in 
order to struggle against oppression, an intentional engagement with difference and a responsibility to 
not perpetuate the oppression of others are essential: “If it takes head-on collisions, let’s do it. This polite 
timidity is killing us” (Moraga 1983, 58–59)—as is our failure to engage with difference. 
Notes
1. A similar challenge to false homogeneity among women can be found in Patricia Hill Collins’s “matrix of domination.”
2. JeeYeun Lee similarly asks: “Whenever someone says the word ‘women’ to me, my mind goes blank. What ‘wom-
en’? What is this ‘women’ thing you are talking about?… Sisterhood may be global, but who is in that sisterhood?” (1995, 
73). In the case of the social movement Wolf advocates for, “we” cannot include non-Western women, who are cut out 
by her description of the women she speaks of as “Western.” But who is Western? Can all women living in North Amer-
ica and Europe be characterized as Western women? Probably not, if it is laws, policy changes, and a single grass-roots 
movement that could grant them full equality—it is more likely that by “Western” Wolf means “American women.”
3. In particular, Judith Butler highlights this as a longstanding criticism, as even “[i]n the early 1980s, the feminist 
‘we’ rightly came under attack by women of color who claimed that the ‘we’ was invariably white, and that the ‘we’ that 
was meant to solidify the movement was the very source of painful factionalization” (Butler 1992, 15). Indeed, with 
these types of exclusions, both in definition and effect, rather than reworking the very matrix of power being fought 
against, mobilization is occurring on the basis of existing configurations of discourse and power (Butler 1992). In their 
fight for equality, Black Lives Matters activists have also demonstrated that contemporary feminist projects often do 
not include women of color and that this failure is deeply problematic (Moore and Casper 2014).
4. Despite the important victories won by Black Lives Matter, and the critical projects its activists continue to pur-
sue, in this respect the movement has struggled with living up to Garza’s ambitions. Garza herself has noted that “het-
ero-patriarchy and anti-Black racism within our movement is real and felt” (Garza 2014, 4). This assessment has been 
echoed by others, including Kaavya Asoka, who observed that while Black Lives Matter has paid attention to intersec-
tionality, when it comes to fighting back against police brutality it has primarily remained focused on the experiences 
of Black men (Chatelain and Asoka 2015). Meanwhile, Marquis Bey has critiqued the Black Lives Matter movement as 
“largely androcentric” and noted the irony of racialized violence experienced by Black women and girls being “elided 
from media coverage and thus relegated to a space of nonimportance in the social imagination, despite the fact that the 
very Black Lives Matter movement was started by Patrisse Cullors, Alicia Garza, and Opal Tometi—Black queer women” 
(Bey 2015, 11). Bey goes further in directly connecting his criticism of Black Lives Matter’s heterosexist androcentrism 
with others’ critiques of White feminists who ignore race. In particular, he highlights the lack of attention Black Lives 
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Matter has paid to the killing of Black trans people: “In the context of the Black Lives Matter movement, to critique it 
even further, pulling a maneuver similar to Black feminists’ critique of white feminists’ white solipsism—essentially a 
critique of a critique—it seems that all Black lives do not truly matter, considering the veritable erasure of the murders 
of Black trans people” (Bey 2015, 12).
5. Committing to the contextual nature of knowledge permits us “to argue that it is easier and more likely for the 
oppressed to have critical insights into the conditions of their own oppression than it is for those who live outside these 
structures” (Narayan 1989, 264; original emphasis). 
6. Herein, “self-interest” is intended to denote issues that are of interest to a person, but not in an exclusionary or 
exclusive way where “self-interested” refers to interests pursued without regard for others or in exclusion of others. 
Within this conceptualization, self-interests can (and often do) align with the interests of others. It is important to note 
that often these interests are connected to aspects of our individual identities, and that an individual’s self-interest is 
often not determined solely by what they may choose to be interested in. Rather, and much like choice, which can also 
be conditioned and constrained (Hirschmann 2010), self-interest too can be conditioned and influenced by the matrix 
of domination and existing power structures in which we live.
7. For example, Sojourner Truth was a Black woman born into slavery in late 1700s, who later became a free Black 
woman. Her theories stood at the intersection of abolitionism and women’s rights, especially as expressed in her germi-
nal speech  “Ain’t I a Woman” (1851). As Freedman notes, Truth’s message serves as an early and important reminder 
to feminists that middle-class White women’s experiences do not encompass the full range of women’s subordina-
tion (Freedman 2008, 4). In 1920, Truth’s words were echoed by Charlotte Hawkins Brown in her speech to a YWCA 
conference in Memphis, in which she forced the White women in attendance to look outside of their own experience 
when thinking about the nature and character of women’s oppression in the United States, to put themselves in Black 
women’s place in order to reconceptualize womanhood as a more complicated entity, and to build a politics of coalition 
across the racial divide (Freedman 2008, 1–2).
8. The Combahee River Collective’s statement is dated April 1977.
9. Maxine Baca Zinn and Bonnie Thornton Dill note that multiracial feminism “is an attempt to go beyond a mere 
recognition of diversity and difference among women to examine structures of domination, specifically the importance 
of race in understanding the social construction of gender” (1996, 321).
10. A notable example can be found in Audre Lorde’s assertion that “homophobia and heterosexism mean you [Black 
women] allow yourselves to be robbed of the sisterhood and strength of Black Lesbian women because you are afraid of be-
ing called a Lesbian yourself. Yet we share so many concerns as Black women, so much work to be done” (Lorde 1988, 24).
11. Because of the breadth of influential theories on the topic and in order to balance conciseness with allowing for a 
nuanced discussion of complicated and important theories, in this paper’s discussion of the works of feminists of color 
as they relate to coalitional theory I chose to focus on several key works while not fully delving into others. Because this 
paper focuses on the works of feminists of color that directly deal with coalitional theory and efforts at coalitional build-
ing, such as Guinier and Torres’s book, discussions of other germinal works by feminist theorists of color are necessarily 
brief. However, the influences of other feminist theorists of color—especially Anzaldúa and hooks—upon coalitional 
theory and practice should not be underestimated.
12. While many other theorists have also put forth important accounts of feminist coalition—including Donna Ha-
raway, Jennifer Purvis, and Bernice Johnson Reagon, whose works are addressed briefly herein—their focus has not 
been on how lived identities such as race, class, gender, and sexuality complicate coalition building and theorizing. 
Christensen and Collins center their discussions on building feminist coalitions across issues and groups that touch on 
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gender, race, class, and sexuality, and thus detailed discussion of their work is essential to formulate a theorization of 
feminist coalitions that acknowledges these issues.
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